DETERRENCE, BRUTALIZATION, AND THE DEATH PENALTY: ANOTHER EXAMINATION OF OKLAHOMA'S RETURN TO CAPITAL PUNISHMENT WILLIAM C. BAILEY Cleveland State University
A replication and extension of a weekly ARIMA analysis (1989 1991) by Cochran et al. (1994) , which appeared in Criminology, con firms that Oklahoma's return to capital punishment in 1990, after In an article that appeared in Criminology, Cochran et al. (1994) pro vide an important contribution to a long line of research examining the effect of capital punishment on murder. They point out that with few exceptions (Bowers and Pierce, 1980; Ehrlich, 1975 Ehrlich, , 1977 King, 1978; Phil lips, 1980; Stack, 1987) , death penalty investigators have found no consis tent evidence that capital punishment is associated with either lower (deterrence) or higher (brutalization) homicide rates. Rather, the over whelming pattern is support for the null hypothesis that capital punish ment neither discourages nor encourages murd'er.
Despite this evidence, Cochran et al. argue that both deterrence and brutalization might be operating to some degree for different types of murder. However, because most researchers examine the overall homi cide rate, this important variation is masked. That is, if capital punishment discourages some types of homicide but encourages other types, it is not 711 712 surprising that most studies find essentially a "zero" relationship between capital punishment ap.d the general homicide rate.
Deterrence investigators are not unaware of the need to examine death eligible homicides. To the contrary, they long have recognized the impor tance of doing so, but have been hampered by the inability to disaggregate official homicide data. Several studies have overcome this obstacle and have examined some types of capital killings: premeditated murder and felony murder (Bailey, 1975 (Bailey, , 1984 Dann, 1935; Peterson and Bailey, 1991; Savitz, 1958) . Still, like general homicide studies, these efforts have pro vided no indication of deterrence.
Researchers examining the brutalization argument (Bowers, 1988; King, 1978) have not given systematic attention to which types of murder might be more or less encouraged by capital punishment. For example, Bowers and Pierce (1980:456) contend that executions devalue human life and legitimate lethal vengeance, but they do not indicate how brutalization operates for homicides occurring under different circumstances. In light of the limited understanding of whether brutalization/deterrence applies for different types of killing, the Cochran et al. article makes an important contribution by examining the influence of executions for different types of killing.
More specifically, Cochran et al. posit that killings involving strangers may be incited by capital punishment. They contend that, in general, if inhibitions against the use of lethal violence to solve problems created by "unworthy" others are reduced by executions, "such a brutalization effect is most likely to occur in 'situated transactions' ... where inhibitions against the use of violence are already absent or considerably relaxed" (1994:110) . Affronts by strangers involve such a context due to the fact that social ties, and hence social controls, are much weaker for persons not known to one another. Cochran et al. confirm empirically that for one jurisdiction, Oklahoma for 1989-1991, a return to capital punishment after a 25-year moratorium on executions was followed by an immediate and permanent increase in killings among strangers. A weekly time-series ARIMA analysis showed that the execution of Charles Troy Coleman on September 10, 1990, was followed by a significant increase in overall stran ger killings. However, not all types of homicide involving strangers increased significantly following the Coleman execution. Rather, signifi cant increases were observed only for nonfelony and argument-related stranger killings. Felony-murders and robbery-related killings involving strangers did not increase significantly following the imposition of the death penalty on Coleman. Weekly killings neither increased nor decreased significantly for (1) total murders, (2) total felony murders, (3) total robbery-related killings, and (4) total death-eligible murders. Cochran et al. regard their findings as preliminary, and they call for further 713 research "to explicate the links between the implementation of the death penalty and changes in the levels of both total and disaggregated measures of stranger homicides" (p. 130). This article provides further evidence on this important issue.
The analysis presented below extends the Cochran et al. study of Oklahoma homicides by (1) considering important death penalty variables not considered in the earlier analysis-the levels of execution and media coverage devoted to executions during the 1989-1991 period; (2) examin ing the immediate (within the week) and possible delayed deterrentlbru talization effects of the death penalty for the different types of murder; and (3) incorporating the execution and selected sociodemographic vari ables into a multivariate time-series regression analysis. This is done to avoid possible spurious results suggesting deterrent or brutalization effects for the Coleman intervention factor and the execution publicity variables that might be due to changes in demographic or economic conditions in Oklahoma during the period.
Cochran et al. have facilitated greatly this analysis by providing both the homicide file that they received from the Supplementary Homicide Reports (SHR) of the Oklahoma Uniform Crime Reports, and their weekly code sheets for different types of killing. With these two sources, I have been able to (1) replicate the Cochran et al. analysis for the types of homi cide they examined, (2) extend their analysis by considering the impact of levels of execution and publicity for various types of stranger and non stranger killings, and (3) examine the merits of ARIMA modeling versus multivariate autoregressive techniques for isolating the effect of capital punishment.
METHODOLOGY
Initially, I employed the same general methodology as Cochran and his colleagues. Using their code sheets and "raw" SHR homicide incident data, weekly time series were formed for the 1989-1991 period (n = 156 weeks) for the types of murder examined earlier: (1) total killings, (2) total felony murders, (3) total robbery-related killings, (4) total death-eligible murders, (5) total killings involving strangers, (6) felony murders not involving strangers, (7) stranger robbery-related killings, (8) stranger nonfelony related murders, and (9) argument-related killings involving strangers. In addition, weekly time series were formed for (10) total non stranger killings and (11) robbery-related killings not involving strangers. Cochran et al. did not consider these two related categories.
For the Cochran et al. analysis, the dependent variables were operation alized as the number of weekly homicide incidents. However, homicide victimization is the criterion variable typically used by death penalty inves tigators. Cochran et al. do not discuss why they chose to examine homi cide incidents rather than victim counts. Initially, I viewed Cochran et al.'s choice to use homicide incidents, rather than victimizations, as the depen dent variable as unfortunate because it would make it more difficult to compare their findings with those of previous death penalty analyses. Because some killings involve multiple victims, there are obviously more homicide victimizations than homicide incidents, but Cochran et al. do not discuss the ratio of the two.
Examination of the SHR data for Oklahoma for the 1989-1991 period shows that Cochran and his colleagues' decision to consider homicide inci dents as the criterion variable does not pose a problem. Over the period, the data reveal a total of 690 homicide victims and 672 homicide incidents. That is, for the period most Oklahoma homicide incidents involved but a single victim (ratio: 690/672 = 1.07). Further, for the types of killings noted above, the correlation between weekly homicide incidents and vic tim counts ranges from .87 to 1.00. Thus, the two time-series measure essentially the same thing.1 In light of this comparability, incident-based homicide measures are used in replicating and extending the Cochran et al. analysis. 2 
THE COLEMAN EXECUTION: THE INTERVENTION VARIABLE
Charles Troy Coleman was executed in Oklahoma on September 10, 1990. Cochran et al. treated the 88 weeks leading up to the execution as a pre-intervention period and the week of the execution through the end of December 1991 (n = 68) as an intervention period. However, because of the amount of pUblicity the week before the execution, they also consid ered an alternative variable that differentiated weeks 1-87 from weeks 1. For the types of homicide considered, the respective correlations are as follows for the incident-and victim-based measures: total killings (.98); capital homicides (.93); total felony murders (.92); felony murders involving strangers (.91); felony murders not involving strangers (.97); total robbery-related killings (.87); robbery-related murders involving strangers (.90); robbery murders not involving strangers (.90); total killings involving strangers (.96); nonfelony murders involving strangers (.95); argument-related killings involving strangers (1.00), and total nonstranger killings (.98).
2. A reviewer of an earlier version of this article recommended using weekly offender counts, broken down by race of offender, as an additional dependent variable. The rationale provided for this recommendation was that whites and blacks may be differentially subject to deterrence, with blacks being less deterrable because they have a lower stake in conformity. Such an analysis was not conducted here due to the sizable proportion of homicide incidents in which (1) the number of homicide offenders involved is unknown or not reported by the Oklahoma authorities and (2) the race of the involved offender is unknown or not reported in the homicide data file. 88-156. As one would predict, the results for the two intervention vari ables were the same because the Oil coding for the pre-and intervention weeks only differs for one observation (r = .987). Here, I rely on the for mer measure, treating the intervention period as beginning the week Cole man was put to death (week 89).
EXECUTION PUBLICITY
Cochran et al. view the Coleman execution as providing a natural quasi experiment because of the considerable media attention that it received in Oklahoma. This may be the case, but it is important to note that the researchers did not examine the actual impact of media coverage of execu tions on weekly homicides. During the 1989-1991 period, citizens of Oklahoma were exposed not only to media coverage of the Coleman exe cution, which took place in their own state, but also to coverage of execu tions that took place in other jurisdictions. It is possible that media coverage in Oklahoma of executions that took place in other states could have a significant deterrentlbrutalization effect for Oklahoma killings. If executions signal to citizens that it is right and proper to kill bad persons, the possible brutalization effect of capital punishment that results for Oklahoma citizens might not be restricted solely to executions that take place within the state of Oklahoma. Conversely, if executions signal to the public the negative consequences that can result from taking another per son's life (deterrence), as well as validating the norm against killing (nor mative validation), the general preventive effects (Andenaes, 1974) of executions that take place in other jurisdictions might spill over to discour age killings in Oklahoma. I explore these possibilities in the analysis to follow.
Unfortunately, there is no systematic index, abstract, or other summary data available for Oklahoma's daily newspapers (n = 28), television sta tions (n = 26), or radio stations (over 200) that can be drawn upon to measure the amount of news coverage devoted to executions during the 1989-1991 period. This problem is not unique to Oklahoma; rather it has plagued other time-series analyses of execution publicity and state-level homicide patterns (King, 1978; Stack, 1990 Stack, , 1993 . A common practice has been to operationalize the amount of media attention devoted to execu tions as the level of coverage provided by the "newspaper of record" for a state, such as the South Carolina State for South Carolina (King, 1978) and The Atlanta Constitution for Georgia (Stack, 1993) . Following this prac tice, I draw upon execution coverage that appeared in The Daily Oklahoman during the 1989-1991 period. The "Oklahoman" is the paper of record for the state, and has the largest circulation of the daily newspa pers in Oklahoma.
During the three-year period there was a total of 53 executions in the United States. Of these, 33 received coverage in the Oklahoman, and cov erage appeared during 30 of the 156 weeks in the time period. Drawing upon these data, a media variable was formed by summing the number of days of execution coverage per week (range, 0 to 5). Linking execution coverage and homicides is somewhat problematic in a weekly time-series analysis. For example, the question arises whether levels should be tallied for the week that execution stories actually appear, or for a portion of the story week and the week to follow. To elaborate, if deterrence and/or brutalization is operative, it is reasonable to expect that an execution story that appears during the first few days of the week would be associated with a significant decline/increase in killings for that week. In contrast, the impact of media coverage of an execution that occurred during the last few days of the week (week t) might not be real ized fully until the next (t+1) week. The research reported below uses a measure of newspaper coverage of executions whereby stories that appeared during the first part of the week are considered as taking place during week t, and coverage that took place during the latter part of the week (during day 6 or 7) is considered as taking place during the next (t+1) week.3
OTHER EXECUTIONS
As discussed above, 33 of the 53 executions that took place in the United States between 1989 and 1991 received one or more days of media coverage in the Oklahoman. The deterrence thesis predicts that, in gen eral, homicides should be at a lower level for the weeks in which execu tions received coverage in the Oklahoman. The brutalization thesis predicts higher levels of killing for weeks with media coverage. However, it cannot be assumed that the 20 executions that did not receive coverage in the Oklahoman did not come to the attention of Oklahoma residents via alternative media sources, including other Oklahoma newspapers, out of-state papers, radio, television news, and the like. As noted, there are a number of other daily newspapers in the state, as well as television and radio stations. Thus, it is possible that a portion of Oklahoma residents learned of at least some of the 20 executions that did not receive coverage in the Oklahoman from other newspapers and electronic media, especially from neighboring states. Of note, during the 1989-1991 period executions took place in neighboring Texas (n = 13), Missouri (n = 6), and Arkansas
Unfortunately, there is no way of knowing how many Oklahoma resi dents (1) learned from other media sources about the 33 executions that did receive coverage in the Oklahoman and (2) learned from other media sources about the 20 executions that were not covered by the state's paper of record. However, it is quite likely that some of the executions that did receive coverage in the Oklahoman also were carried by other sources, and that some of the executions that did not appear in the Oklahoman did receive attention by other media sources. For example, a spot check shows that one of the executions that did not receive coverage in the Oklahoman did receive coverage in the state's second largest daily news paper-the Tulsa World, and another received coverage in a Dallas, Texas, daily newspaper that has considerable readership in southern Oklahoma.
In sum, the possibility cannot be ruled out that during the 1989-1991 period, at least some portions of the Oklahoma population were exposed to media coverage of executions from sources other than the Oklahoman. However, for all practical purposes, Oklahoma residents were not exposed to media coverage of executions for the weeks when no executions were conducted. Here, the only exception would be lingering coverage of an execution(s) that took place the previous weekes).
To take into consideration the fact that executions that did receive cov erage in the Oklahoman also may have received coverage from other sources in the state, and that at least some of the executions that did not receive coverage in the Oklahoman did receive alternative media coverage in the state, I introduce the number of weekly executions as an additional death penalty variable in the multivariate analysis. The reasoning here is that the greater the number of weekly executions, the greater the probability of Oklahoma residents being exposed to media coverage of executions. I recognize that apart from weeks in which there were no executions, there was certainly not a one-to-one relationship between the number of weekly executions and the number of executions that were brought to the attention of Oklahoma citizens via the media. However, in the analysis to follow, it does not make sense to treat an execution-free week like a week with one or more executions simply because the execu tion(s) did not receive coverage in the Oklahoman.
During the 1989-1991 period weekly execution counts ranged from zero to three. As with the Oklahoman media coverage variable, a measure of the frequency of capital punishment is used whereby executions that took place during the first part of the week are considered as taking place dur ing week t, and executions that took place during the latter part of the week (during day 6 or 7) are considered as taking place during the next (H1) week. 4 
THE TIMING BETWEEN EXECUTIONS, EXECUTION PUBLICITY, AND HOMICIDES
Time-series analyses of capital punishment have often considered the possibility that executions (and execution publicity) may have both imme diate and lingering effects on homicides. For example, for a weekly time series analysis, the major deterrent/brutalization impact of the death pen alty might be experienced during the execution week (week t), with effects diminishing during the weeks to follow (weeks HI, t+2 ... ). Or, it is possible that the major deterrent/brutalization impact of capital punish ment is delayed by a week or two rather than immediate. A third possibil ity is that the deterrent effect of executions may be more immediate, while brutalization effects are delayed, or vice versa. To consider these possibili ties, in the multivariate analyses that follow homicide counts for week tare regressed against the execution frequency and the media variables for week t, t-l, t-2, and t-3 simultaneously. As the findings reported in the tables to follow make clear, both immediate and delayed execution effects are observed for some types of murder. Lagged execution variables for week t-4 and beyond were also explored, but without significant results.
CONTROL VARIABLES
To isolate the effect of the Coleman execution on homicides, Cochran et al. used ARIMA modeling to control for trend, drift, and autocorrelation. However, ARIMA modeling cannot (1) control specifically for third-vari able sociodemographic factors known to be associated with homicide or (2) isolate the effect of multiple independent variables of interest, such as levels of execution and the amount of news coverage that executions receive. Rather, conventional ARIMA modeling generally is capable of assessing the impact of only a single intervention factor in a time series. Because the deterrence doctrine poses multiple dimensions of capital pun ishment as influencing offense behavior, and homicides are responsive to a number of important structural factors, only rarely (McFarland, 1983) have death penalty investigators used ARIMA techniques. s In this study, actual execution week because it produces results that are more in line with theoretical expectations.
5. A reviewer of an earlier version of this article suggested that my concerns about the merits of ARIMA modeling for the Cochran et al. analysis are overstated because by whitening the data series for the different types of murder, Cochran et al. were able to control for the influence of executions, media coverage of executions, and sociodemographic factors. I disagree with the reviewer. First, by employing conven tional ARIMA strategies, it is possible to more or less "whiten" a series such as the Oklahoma homicide data. When successful, various trend and noise factors are "con trolled," but whitening is often somewhat problematic. Of greater concern, theoreti cally important noise factors were whitened in the Cochran et al. ARIMA analysis, I conduct a multivariate time-series analysis of Oklahoma homicides. By doing so, I can examine the influence of a variety of capital punishment factors, including the Coleman execution, and assess how well the model ing strategy used by Cochran et al. addresses brutalization/deterrence hypotheses.
Common structural control variables used in previous death penalty studies include (1) population size, (2) percent urban population, (3) per cent population 15-34 years of age, (4) percent black population, (5) per cent poverty, low income, or families on public assistance, and (6) the unemployment rate. During the relatively short period involved (1989) (1990) (1991) , Oklahoma did not change dramatically with respect to percents urban and black population. However, for the remaining vari ables there was sufficient change to possibly affect homicides. Thus, this analysis includes the following control factors: (1) population size (range = 3.146 to 3.208 million), (2) percent popUlation 15-34 years of age (range, 30% to 33%), (3) percent population receiving AFDC benefits (range, 3% to 4%), and (4) percent unemployment (range, 5% to 7%).6
As additional controls, monthly dummy variables for each type of homi cide were included if the number of such killings was significantly higher including levels of execution and the media coverage they received. But why treat executions and execution publicity as simply noise to be removed from the data series?
Levels of execution and the amount of publicity they receive (along with the Cole man intervention) are of fundamental theoretical importance to deterrence and brutali zation arguments. For this reason, I view conventional multivariate autoregressive procedures as far more informative than standard single intervention ARIMA model ing in considering deterrencelbrutalization questions for Oklahoma. Why be satisfied with a single Coleman execution intervention estimate with ARIMA when conven tional multivariate autoregressive procedures also (1) provide an estimate for the effect of the Coleman intervention, (2) provide estimates for the impact of executions and execution publicity, as well as (3) provide estimates for how changing sociodemographic conditions over the 1989-1991 period may have influenced Oklahoma killings. The fundamental weakness of conventional ARIMA modeling for this type of study clearly is demonstrated by my findings for the frequency of executions and execution publicity variables.
6. Unfortunately, weekly figures were not available for the control variables for the 1989-1991 period. Rather, only monthly figures were available for the unemploy ment rate and AFDC factors; and only annual data were available for population size and percent population 15-34 years of age. In the multivariate analyses (Tables 2-6), month figures are used for the control variables. For the two population variables, monthly estimates were formed through linear interpolation. I do not view the use of monthly (rather than weekly) values for the control variables as a serious problem since my interest is not in directly estimating the impact of these structural factors on homi cides. Rather, the control variables are included in the analysis to take into account general shifts in important sociodemographic conditions over the 1989-1991 period. 720 or lower for a given month compared to other months. 7 This method of controlling for months in which levels of homicide are atypically higher or lower than average is preferable to the practice of forming 12 distinct dummy variables and including 11 of the 12 monthly dummies in a regres sion analysis. While some death penalty researchers have done so, this procedure is not followed here because it treats each monthly dummy variable as if it makes a unique contribution to homicides, a pattern that to my knowledge never has been observed. Further, such a procedure need lessly sacrifices degrees of freedom in the analysis.
MULTICOLLINEARITY
To explore possible collinearity problems for the variables of interest, a series of auxiliary regressions were conducted in which each death penalty factor was regressed against the control and other execution variables. When the number of weekly executions was regressed against the controls, the Coleman execution intervention dummy (0/1) variable, and the execu tion publicity variable, the resulting R2 value was .39. When the media coverage variable was treated as dependent, the resulting R2 value was 040. And, when the Coleman intervention variable was treated as the criterion variable, the R2 value was .75.
The size of the R2 value (.75) for the Coleman intervention variable indicates that this factor is associated strongly with some of the other predictors: percent 15-34 years of age (r = -.77), level of unemployment (r = .53) and percent AFDC population (r = .83). Because of these associa tions, it is important to consider the impact of the Coleman execution in a multivariate context. It is easy to imagine how Oklahoma's homicide pat terns may have shifted over the 1989-1991 period due to changes in soci odemographic conditions, and these shifts seem to correspond with the pre-and Coleman-execution periods. However, to assume that the Cole man execution caused changes in sociodemographic conditions in Oklahoma obviously is not reasonable.
In contrast, the auxiliary regression analysis does not signal obvious col linearity problems for the execution frequency (R2 = .39) and execution publicity (R2 = 040) variables. However, the number of executions per week and the number of days of newspaper coverage of executions per week are correlated at a moderate level (r = .615) for the 1989-1991 time 7. For total killings, capital homicides, stranger nonfelony murders, and non stranger killings, counts were not significantly higher or lower than average for any of the 12 months. For total felony murders, incident counts were significantly below aver age for November; homicide frequencies were significantly higher than average for Jan uary for felony murders not involving strangers, total robbery-related murders, and robbery murders not involving strangers. For total killings involving strangers, counts were significantly above the monthly average for September. 721 series. The relationship between these two death penalty variables has been raised as a matter of concern by a reviewer of an earlier version of this article. There is, of course, an asymmetrical dependence between the frequency of executions and media coverage of executions. Without the occurrence of an execution, there can be no media coverage. However, not all of the 53 executions in the United States during the period received coverage by the Oklahoman (33/53 = 62%). Because of the overlap between these two variables (n = 33), the reviewer recommended that I first estimate the multivariate models including both the frequency of executions and amount of media coverage and, second, exclude the fre quency of execution variable from the analysis. I do so in the analysis to follow in examining the dependency between the two execution variables. Alternatively, the regression models also are estimated including the fre quency of execution variables and excluding the media coverage variables.
FINDINGS
The first step in the analysis was to "enter and proof" the data for the different types of homicide. Since Cochran et al. provided their data code sheets, I had no difficulty replicating the univariate patterns reported in the earlier study. Because the earlier findings are confirmed, results of this analysis are not reported in tabular or graphic form.
BIVARIATE RESULTS
The second step was to compare the average number of weekly killings before and after the Coleman execution for the different types of murder. Table 1 reports the mean number of homicides for the pre-(n = 88) and Coleman-execution (n = 68) weeks for each type of murder for the 1989-1991 period. Of the 12 offense categories, average weekly homicides increased for (1) total killings, (2) felony murders involving strangers, (3) total robbery-related killings, (4) robbery-related killings involving stran gers, (5) total stranger killings, (6) stranger argument-related killings, and (7) stranger nonfelony killings. The increases were significant for total stranger killings, stranger argument-related killings, and stranger nonfelony killings. These results are consistent with Cochran et al.'s report of a "brutalization" pattern for these three offense categories.
In contrast, the average number of weekly (1) capital homicides, (2) total felony murders, (3) nonstranger felony murders, (4) robbery-related murders not involving strangers, and (5) nonstranger killings declined fol lowing the Coleman execution. However, none of these decreases was sta tistically significant.
In short, as Cochran et al. found, the before-after analysis is suggestive of a brutalization effect for the Coleman execution for some, but not other, types of stranger homicide. Of particular note, the brutalization effect of the Coleman execution appears to be confined to nonfelony, argument-related killings. The average number of felony murders (.22 vs. .35) involving strangers increased considerably following the Coleman execution, but not significantly (at the .05 level). There is no evidence of a significant deterrent effect resulting from the Coleman execution. The inci dent of felony murders not involving strangers (.34 vs..22) declined notice ably, but not significantly, after this execution. The question of whether these bivariate patterns will continue to hold when additional execution and control factors are considered is addressed below.
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS
As a first step in the multivariate analysis, the autoregressive structure was examined for each type of murder for lag periods ranging through t-20 weeks. The SAS (statistical analysis system) autoregressive procedure (SAS Institute, 1985) was used to identify, and where necessary, to fit autoregressive models. In the regression analysis to follow, Yule-Walker estimates are reported where significant autocorrelation was observed.
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Ordinary least squares estimates are presented where there is not signifi cant autocorrelation.
To reiterate, in general, the deterrence doctrine leads one to expect a significant inverse relationship between homicides and the Coleman inter vention, levels of execution, and the amount of media coverage of execu tions, net of the control factors. Conversely, the brutalization argument predicts that death penalty factors should be associated positively with homicides when other variables are controlled. These predictions are con sidered in Tables 2-6. Table 2 reports the results for total killings, capital murders, homicides associated with other felonies, and robbery-related killings.8
Contrary to the deterrence perspective, there is no indication that the Coleman execution was followed by a significant decrease in weekly kill ings for any of the four homicide categories. Only for capital murders was there a noticeable decline in killings following the Coleman execution (b = -.348, s.e. = .225, t = -1.55), but the reduction fell short of achieving statis tical significance at the conventional .05 level (t = 1.66 or higher). There also is no indication that levels of execution or the days of news coverage of executions in the United States produced a significant deterrent effect on homicides.
In contrast, there is a suggestion of brutalization in Table 2 , but it stems from execution publicity rather than from the Coleman intervention or the number of executions. Neither of the latter two variables resulted in a significant increase in any of the four types of homicide. By contrast, for three of the four types of killing, one or another of the media variables is associated with a significant increase in homicides. The total number of Oklahoma killings increased significantly (b = .751, s.e. = .367, t = 2.05) during weeks t when there was newspaper coverage of executions. In the case of capital homicides, the coefficient for media coverage of executions during week t falls short of statistical significance (t = 1.60 vs. t = 1.66), but the level of media attention given to executions for week t-2 is associated positively, and significantly, with these killings (b = .230, s.e. = .129, t = 1.78). For robbery-related killings, the amount of media coverage of executions during the execution week is associated significantly, and posi tively, with this type of murder (b = .185, s.e. = .108, t = 1.71). None of the media variables is associated significantly with total felony murder.
In sum, Table 2 gives a clear suggestion that the overall level of murder, capital homicides, and robbery-related killings was encouraged, and not discouraged, in Oklahoma by media coverage of executions. I next • P < .05.
examine whether this apparent brutalization effect is a function of stranger killings that are included in these three offense categories. Table 3 reports the regression results for four categories of homicide involving parties not known to one another: (1) all killings involving stran gers, (2) felony murders involving strangers, (3) nonfelony murders involv ing strangers, and (4) robbery-related killings involving strangers. 9 The results of this analysis are mixed for the deterrence and brutalization hypotheses. First, consistent with the results reported by Cochran et aI., the Coleman execution was followed by a significant increase in overall stranger and nonfelony stranger killings, but not felony murder or rob bery-homicide involving strangers. These more utilitarian types of stran ger murder did increase following the Coleman execution, but not significantly.
KILLINGS INVOLVING STRANGERS
Second, there is no indication that the volume of weekly or lagged executions caused a significant increase or decrease in the levels of total, 9. The offense category "argument-related killings involving strangers" (n = 16) is excluded from the multivariate analysis reported in Table 3 . Their very small number (4 during the pre-Coleman execution period and 12 following the Coleman execution) does not permit a reliable analysis. ger nonfelony killings, there is a suggestion of brutalization for media cov erage of executions during week t, but an apparent deterrent effect for levels of execution during week t-1. In sum, there are suggestions of both brutalization and deterrence in Table 3 . However, no simple explanation of the mixed pattern is possible. The same type of stranger murder (e.g., stranger felony and stranger nonfelony killings) appears to be encouraged by some aspects of capital punishment, but discouraged by others. For example, the number of executions seems to discourage stranger felony killings while media cover age appears to promote this type of homicide. Also puzzling, the media variables show conflicting patterns regarding nonfelony stranger murder.
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For reasons that are not obvious, there is a suggestion that the immediate effect (during week t) of media coverage of executions is to promote nonfelony stranger killings, but the impact turns in the opposite direction toward deterrence for the week t-1 media variable for these type of kill ings. Of interest, the positive week t (b =.174) and negative week t-1 (b = -.173) media coefficients are nearly identical in size and essentially cancel one another out for a net result of .001. Table 4 gives no indication of a significant deterrent effect for any of the death penalty variables for the three categories of homicide not involving strangers. The only suggestion of deterrence is for total nonstranger killings. On average, the weekly count for these types of killing declined by -.735 (s.e. = .448, t = 1.64) following the Coleman execution, but this pattern falls just short of achieving statistical significance (t = 1.66).
KILLINGS INVOLVING NONSTRANGERS
Contrary to expectations and the Cochran et al. discussion , Table 4 sug gests that the amount of media attention devoted to executions (but not the number of executions) actually may have promoted nonstranger homi cides as well. The levels of total nonstranger homicide are associated sig nificantly with the number of days of news coverage of executions during week t-1 (b = .517, s.e. = .293, t = 1.76). A similar pattern holds for non stranger felony murders for the t-3 lagged media variable (b = .144, s.e. =
.083, t = 1.73). It simply is unclear why a possible brutalization effect for newspaper coverage of executions might have been confined to the week t-3 (versus week t, t-1, or t-2) media factor for these type of killings.
A FURTHER ANALYSIS
A reviewer of an earlier version of this article questioned whether the dependence between the weekly frequency of executions and media cov erage variables might pose a collinearity problem biasing the coefficients for the frequency of execution variables in a negative direction. Such a possibility could account for the mixed pattern observed for the two types of execution variables for felony murders involving strangers (Table 3) .
To explore this dependency issue, each of the models presented in Tables 2-4 was reestimated excluding the frequency of execution variables for weeks t through t-3. Following this procedure, the same pattern of findings resulted for the Coleman intervention and media coverage vari ables for all but four types of killing-capital homicides, total felony murders, nonfelony killings involving strangers, and robbery-related kill ings involving strangers. Because of the redundancy of the findings for the Coleman and media variables, I present in Table 5 the regression results only for the four offenses for which there were significant departures from the earlier (Tables 2-4) analyses.
The departures from the earlier pattern that are presented in Table 5 all provide additional evidence of a brutalization effect for publicized execu tions. For capital murders, again, there is a significant positive coefficient for week (-2 media coverage, but the positive media coefficient for week ( is now also significant (b = .242, s.e. = .098, ( = 2.47). Also in contrast to the earlier pattern, in the revised analysis the media coefficients for week ( are positive and statistically significant for both total felony murders (b = .223, s.e. = .108, ( = 2.06) and robbery murders involving strangers (b = .111, s.e. = .063, ( = 1.76).
Also presented in Table 5 are the findings for nonfelony murders involv ing strangers. In the earlier analysis (Table 3) To explore further the possible dependency between the execution fre quency and media coverage factors, I repeated the above analysis (Tables  2-4) , but now excluding the media variables. Table 6 reports the findings for this analysis for the five offense categories for which there was a signif icant change in the results for one or more of the weekly execution count variables.
Like the results reported in Table 5 , this extended analysis produces additional evidence of brutalization. Now, the level of executions for week t is associated with a significantly higher number of capital homicides (b =.266, s.e. =.105, t =2.53) and total robbery-related killings (b =.156, s.e. =.089, t =1.75). In addition, week t-1 executions are associated with a significantly higher number of total killings (b =.443, s.e. =.267, t =1.67), as are week t-2 executions with felony murders not involving strangers (b = .271, s.e. = .074, t =3.66).
Not only does excluding the media variables add to the evidence of bru talization for the execution frequency variables for these four types of murder, but the suggestion of a significant deterrent effect for executions for felony murders involving strangers is absent from Table 6. In the ear lier analysis (Table 3) , the media coefficients were negative and statisti cally significant for week t-1 (b =-.244), s.e. =.104) and week t-2 (b =-.194, s.e. =.106), but this is now no longer the case: b =.071, s.e. =.079 and b = -.011, s.e. = .079, respectively. These contrasting patterns suggest a depen dence between the frequency of execution and media coverage variables that, at least for one offense category, artifactually produces an indication· of a deterrent effect for executions. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Increasingly some opponents of the death penalty contend that capital punishment has a brutalization rather than deterrent influence on homi cide. In developing their arguments, these analysts seldom distinguish between types of homicide. The assumption appears to be that all types of killing are encouraged by capital punishment. By contrast, the deterrence doctrine emphasizes that the death penalty may be more effective in preventing some types of killings than others; still, few deterrence investi gators have examined empirically homicides disaggregated by type. Rather, both deterrence and brutalization analysts tend to examine overall rates of homicide rather than specific types of killing.
The study by Cochran et al. (1994) is an important exception. They pro vide a rationale for why some types of murder may be deterred, while other types are incited, by executions. However, Cochran et al. did not take into consideration the deterrencelbrutalization importance of multi ple dimensions of capital punishment in their attempt to isolate the effect of Oklahoma's return to capital punishment. Importantly, Cochran et al. regard their work as preliminary and they encourage criminologists to rep licate and extend their study. In this study, I have done so by employing a multivariate autoregressive analysis that incorporates additional death penalty factors and control variables that might have had an impact on Oklahoma killings.
Based on Cochran et al. 's arguments, I expected a brutalization effect for the frequency of execution and media variables for stranger, and espe cially nonutilitarian stranger, killings, but not for the other types of homi cide. This expectation was not borne out by the analysis. First, after taking into consideration the sociodemographic control variables, the exe cution frequency, and media coverage factors, the evidence persisted that the Coleman execution was followed by a significant increase in total stranger killings and stranger homicides not involving other felonies. These findings parallel the results of the Cochran et al. ARIMA analysis. Second, additional evidence of brutalization was observed from the ini tial (Tables 2-4 ) and extended (Tables 5-6) analysis for the execution fre quency and media coverage variables for (1) total killings, (2) capital homicides, (3) total felony murder, (4) total robbery-related killings, (5) total stranger killings, (6) stranger felony murders, (7) stranger nonfelony killings, (8) stranger robbery-related killings, (9) total nonstranger homi cides, and (10) nonstranger felony murders. For each of these offense cat egories, week ( or lagged execution counts and/or media coverage of executions was associated with a significant increase in weekly homicides. These findings suggest that executions that occurred in other states may have had a brutalization consequence in Oklahoma. Recall that between 1989 and 1991 only 1 of the nation's 53 executions took place in Oklahoma.
Third, the findings regarding the deterrence hypothesis are generally in line with previous studies. Of the 11 offense categories considered, there is no indication that media coverage of executions discourages homicide. There is one slight exception to this null pattern for stranger nonfelony killings for the week (-2 lagged media variable (b = -.173, p < .05). This pattern persists when the frequency of execution variables are excluded from the analysis (b = -.149, s.e. = .070, ( = -2.13). I have no explanation for this quirky result. However, it is noteworthy that for the same offense for the initial analysis (Table 3) , the significant coefficient for the week ( media factor (b = .174, P < .05) is almost identical in size, but opposite in direction. When the week ( (brutalization) and week (-1 (deterrence) effects of media coverage are summed, the net result is essentially a zero media effect for stranger nonfelony killings. The pattern is quite similar for the media variables for week ((b = .143) and week (-1 (b = -.149) in the extended analysis in which the frequency of execution variables are excluded from the models (Table 5) . Of further interest, in this extended analysis the media coefficient for week (-2 is positive and statistically sig nificant (b = .240, s.e. = .070, ( =3.43).
The only suggestion of a possible deterrent effect for capital punishment is for the frequency of execution variables for felony murders involving strangers. The initial analysis (Table 3) showed that higher levels of execu tion during week (-1 and week (-2 were associated with a significantly lower number of stranger felony murders (b = -.224 and b = -.194, respec tively). However, even for these types of killing, definitive conclusions cannot be drawn. Recall (see Table 3 ) that the results for the week t-1 and week t-2 media variables were also significant for felony murders involving strangers, but in the opposite direction, thus suggesting a brutalization effect. These contrasting patterns are puzzling. Why would a higher number of executions discourage (deter) felony murders involving stran gers, while higher levels of media coverage of executions promote (brutali zation) these types of murder? The extended analysis presented in Table 6 may provide an answer to this question. As detailed above, when the exe cution media variables are excluded from the analysis, there is only a weak negative, and chance only, relationship between stranger felony murders and the frequency of executions for weeks t-1 and t-2. This pattern ques tions the possibility of a genuine (and not just apparent) significant rela tionship between felony murders involving strangers in Oklahoma and the level of weekly executions in the United States during the 1989-1991 period.
Finally, it should be noted that the goodness of fit of the models presented in Tables 2-6 is rather poor. The multiple R2 values range from .110 to .166. To a certain degree the poor fit may be due to important structural factors not being included in the analysis. However, a more likely explanation is that weekly homicide time series are subject to con siderable noise and are by their nature not very stable. As temporal units of analysis become longer (such as with months, quarters, or years), homi cide trends become more stable, and multivariate analyses typically pro duce better fits. To illustrate, from a monthly time-series analysis of execution pUblicity and the overall homicide rate in Georgia (1950-1965, n =192 months), Stack (1993) reports an R2 value of only .19. When years rather than weeks or months are considered in time series, R2 values are commonly in the .60 to .80 range.
In short, the relatively low R2 values associated with the above models are not a major concern. For this type of analysis, weeks are simply noise units. However, weeks are important units to consider if the deterrence/ brutalization effects of capital punishment are rather immediate and short lived.
In conclusion, this replication and extension of the Cochran et al. analy sis demonstrates that it is a mistake for criminologists to treat the deter rence/brutalization question as a dead issue. It is equally a mistake for death penalty investigators to be content with "testing" deterrence/brutali zation arguments by simply examining general homicides. Rather, detailed combinations of homicide circumstances and victim-offender rela tionships must be considered, as well as the possibility that the deterrent/ brutalization impact of capital punishment may differ for different dimen sions of capital punishment.
I recommend that the next round of deterrencelbrutalization research extend this analysis by considering additional and more diverse jurisdic tions, and more extended time periods. Besides Oklahoma, a number of other states have returned to capital punishment in the past few years after long nonexecution periods (California, Illinois, Delaware, Washington, Wyoming). In addition, a number of jurisdictions that have not conducted an execution for decades have large death row populations (Ohio, Penn sylvania, Kentucky, Tennessee, New Jersey, Maryland). The former and latter jurisdictions (when executions resume) can be examined as addi tional natural quasi-experiments (Campbell, 1969) to both clarify and determine the generalizability of the findings for Oklahoma.
